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Although the safety production level at small scale enterprises is important for business success, critical safety interactions among
the enterprises, its employees, the public, and the government have not been explained well in the literature. To address this gap,
a bottom-up method of agent-based modeling is applied here that includes these key stakeholders. The study illustrates how
employee protection-oriented safety proactivity behaviors, including whistleblowing and public exposure, can impact the safety
production level at small scale enterprises, which are also watched by the public and regulated by the government. The results
confirm that protection-oriented safety proactivity behaviors have a significant impact on the safety production levels at small
enterprises through the interactions among multiple agents.The model results are validated using an employee questionnaire.The
recommendation is for employees to encourage protection-oriented safety proactivity behaviors to improve safety production levels
and for the public and the government to provide additional safety support.
1. Introduction
In China, in 2014, there were 11.6987 million small scale
enterprises (SSEs), accounting for 76.57% of all enterprises
and more than 70 % of all jobs [1]. In the European Union,
by contrast, SSEs accounted for 98.7% of all enterprises and
employed 50.2% of all employees, with large and medium
enterprises accounting for only 1.3% of the total number
of enterprises, although they account for 49.8% of total
employment [2]. In theUnited States, SSEs accounted for 95%
of all enterprises [3].
Obviously, SSEs are making a huge contribution to global
economic development and employment. However, on-the-
job fatalities and injuries continue to be problems for SSEs.
Thus, it is not surprising that governments around the world
are increasing their investments in safety intervention to
improve safety levels. For instance, the Chinese government
has implemented safety production standardization [4], and
the European Union and the United States governments have
implemented theOccupationalHealth and Safety Assessment
Series (OHSAS 18001:2007) [5], the American National Stan-
dards Institute (ANSI/AIHA Z10-2012) [6], and the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Voluntary
Protection Program (VPP) [7].
Most SSEs are unable to meet safety standards fully
because of their management characteristics, such as limited
resources, weak safety management practices, or a lack of
safety awareness [8, 9]. SSEs have poorer occupational safety
and health (OSH) conditions in general and higher accident
rates than large and medium enterprises [10, 11]. Thus, their
safety management characteristics may be the main obstacle
to maintaining and enhancing their safety production levels
[12, 13].
Many studies have stated that improving the safety
climate [14–19], safety leadership [20], safety management
[21], and the workplace environment [22] may reduce the
rate of accidents and injuries. Moreover, employee factors,
such as safety knowledge [23], safety motivation [24], and job
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satisfaction [25], may affect safety performance as well [23].
To improve the safety level of production, it is apparent that
all the key stakeholders, the SSEs, their employees, the public,
and the government must take action together.
However, although safety performance has been ana-
lyzed, the safety interactions among the SSE, its employees,
the public, and the government have not been explained well
in the literature. Thus, there is a need for more research
that models the interactions among these key players and
the influence of these interactions on safety levels in a given
environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly reviews the literature. Enterprise interviews are intro-
duced in Section 3. Agent attributes aremodeled in Section 4.
Simulated scenarios and model assumptions are described
in Section 5. Furthermore, model results are presented in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
SSEs show a higher accident rate and amore dangerous work-
place environment than large enterprises [26–28]. In SSEs,
occupational health and safety promotions are adequately
present in different methods [29–37]; however, there is a lack
of comprehensive safety interventions [38–42]. The current,
safety research on SSEs has focused on conceptual modeling
verified with structural equation modeling methods. In
order to better understand each stakeholder impacting safety
production levels, the characteristics of stakeholders and
their interactions must be modeled. Palaniappan et al. [43]
proposed an agent-based model to explain the interaction
between workers and the impacts of their safety behaviors on
the safety climate and productivity. An agent-based approach
was proposed by Sharpanskykh and Stroeve [44] to analyze
safety culture in an air navigation service provider. Shapira et
al. [45] developed an integrative model by designed weights
of each risk factor in order to quantify the safety level.
According to cause-effect loops, the influence of owners,
designers, contractors, supervisors, and the government on
safety levels was analyzed using system dynamics model [46].
The interaction among project stakeholders was simulated
in a construction safety climate using agent-based modeling
[47].
2.1. Employee Protection-Oriented Safety Proactivity Behaviors
(EPOS-PB). By definition, protection-oriented safety proac-
tivity behaviors (EPOS-PB) are characterized by creating
an observable impact for the safety of organization. The
scope of this behavior is to protect the organization from
negative consequences associated with safety violations and
with safety standard breakdowns. Examples of EPOS-PB are
stewardship [48], prevention oriented safety voice [49], and
whistleblowing [50]. This study focuses on whistleblowing
as EPOS-PB and its associations with public exposure and
turnover phenomena.
By definition, whistleblowing occurs when employees
report illegal or rule-violating behaviors to authorities out-
side the organization to ensure external awareness [51].
Hofmann et al. [52] defined whistleblowing from a safety
perspective as reporting safety violations, instructing other
colleagues to comply with safety regulations, familiarizing
new team members with safety regulations, reporting col-
leagues who break safety regulations, and not tolerating
colleagues who violate safety regulations.
Whistleblowing may encourage employers to correct
wrongdoings but may also damage an enterprise’s operations,
reputation, and development. However, as the aim of safety
whistleblowing is to prevent injuries and accidents before
they happen, any enterprise operational damage may be
ignored, as the results of injuries and accidents could bemore
destructive.
Exposure and turnover are other EPOS-PB typically
associated with whistleblowing, and this study contributes to
investigating how they can interact with safety proactivity.
In this case, the employee exposes safety information to the
public in order to protect colleagues’ and his/her own health
and safety; moreover, he/she chooses to escape the risky
workplace.
2.2. Safety Production Level. Finding effective and low-cost
safety systems to improve the safety production level is
becoming a critical safety issue, especially in developing
countries.
According to extant research [53], three factors may
impact the perception of the safety level at an enterprise:
employees’ perceived management concerns, management’s
consideration of safety, and management’s consideration of
production. The safety level may be higher if management’s
consideration of safety is stronger. In contrast, the safety level
may be lower if management’s consideration of production
is stronger. The safety level may be impacted by additional
factors, including environmental factors such as sociocultural
values, political decisions, economic policies, and public
policies. All of these factors may affect the implementation
of OSH management and the safety level [54]. Janssens et al.
[53] stated that the safety level of production was measured
by safety performance, the OSH situation, and the safety
of the workplace environment. Isla and Dı´az [55] measured
the safety level based on three factors over 12 months: the
level of safety in specific tasks, employees’ safety compliance
behavior, and operators’ handling of the level of safety.
By utilizing an analytic hierarchy process (AHP), Cagno
et al. [56] found that machines, operators, procedures, and
the environment posed risks and caused safety issues. This
risk essential method may be more practical to measure the
overall safety level of production. Ayomoh and Oke [57]
proposed a new method of a hybrid structural interaction
matrix (HSIM) to quantify factors that may affect the safety
level of production. Therefore, we propose environmental
factors, such as economic policies and safety laws in our
agent-based modeling (ABM).
2.3. Agent-Based Modeling. ABM methodology is a complex
dynamic system that consists of (a) distinct autonomous
heterogeneous agents with different functions; (b) behavioral
rules associated with the interaction among agents, which
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are introduced systematically and dynamically in the system
[58]. A main characteristic of ABM is that the agents update
their strategy based on changing interactions and a changing
environment, an action that is not possible using empirical
or other mathematical methods [59, 60]. ABM has been
applied in various fields in the past two decades including
economics, transportation, sociology, biology, marketing,
and sales among others [61]. However, studies on safety
behaviors and safety production levels are typically empirical
or linear, limiting comprehensive analysis. ABM applies a
bottom-up method that defines different agent strategies and
attributes and builds properties of the environment, allowing
analysis of the interactions among agents in different periods
[62].
In addition, ABM can simulate what-if scenarios, allow-
ing evaluations of the different options to shape enterprises
strategies [58]. For instance, ABM can be used to propose
a model and then change parameters to determine the
responses to the changes. Awwad et al. [47] simulated interac-
tions among project stakeholders within a construction safety
climate during both the bidding and construction phases. Lu
et al. [63] analyzed the interactions among a worksite, con-
struction employees, and various types of safety investments
to identify the interplay between safety investment and safety
performance. In this study, we utilize ABM to analyze how
employee EPOS-PB may have different impacts on the safety
production level under specific environments.
2.4. Safety Management Characteristics of SSEs. Relevant
studies on SSEs have shifted from addressing safety haz-
ards to safety intervention that may reduce accident rates
[9]. Although SSEs are heterogeneous, they share common
business characteristics concerning the delivery of products
and services, according to certain productivity standards and
priorities [64]. Based on studies of SSEs, SSEs employees
may face amore risky workplace environment [65, 66], lower
guarantee of OSH, and lower effective implementation of
safety regulations and laws compared with large enterprises
[67, 68].
Owners of SSEs often play the role of managing safety;
thus, all safety issues are personal decisions rather than based
on specific directives [69]. As owner-managers of SSEs often
take total responsibility for both production and safety, they
have little time to solve safety issues [70].Obviously, the safety
attitude of the owner-manager has a significant impact on the
safety level of production. At the same time, owner-managers
must deal with government safety regulations and laws that
may create a negative effect on OSH and safety management
[67].
As these businesses are heterogeneous, the owner-
managers of the SSEs will have different attitudes and strate-
gies for safety regulations and inspections that affect the safety
levels [71]. Safety information is often limited and owner-
managers may lack the necessary experience or responses
to solve safety issues and face inspections [72]. Because of
insufficient safety knowledge, resources, and funds, there
may be more safety issues among SSEs than in large and
medium enterprises [65, 72]. Recent studies in literature
suggest that managerial intervention is aimed at improving
safety information sharing; a better knowledge of safety
regulation guidelines and employees’ safety participation in
the management of safety can help SSEs to enhance the
quality of safety standards and the maturity of the safety
system [48, 73]. According with this recent trend in literature,
Mei et al. [74] also suggest that stimulating safety proactivity
behaviors could positively impact safety management of
SSEs.
Overall, owner-managers of SSEs often have a poor
understanding of OSH regulations and legislation, have
limited capacity to identify risks and hazards, and may have
negative attitudes to safety inspections [75]. In this context, it
is necessary to equate safety and production.
Obviously, the improvement in safety levels at SSEs relies
not only on the efforts of employees but also on support
from the public and the government. In this study, we utilize
ABM to analyze the interactions among employees, SSEs, the
public, and the government.
3. Enterprise Interviews
This study gathered data on the safety production levels in
Chinese SSEs through semistructured interviews with 105
high-risk SSEs. The literature review and reality confirmed
that there were more accidents and injuries among SSEs than
among large and medium enterprises. According to safety
regulations, owner-managers of SSEs are obliged to report
safety occurrences and ensure safety reform. If accidents
and injuries happen due to illegal production activities, they
may also receive a punishment such as a fine or closure.
Particularly, reports on safety occurrences are useful for
safety analysis (e.g., statistics of accident or injury ratios and
safety improvement for SSEs). Although safety reports are
obligatory, in reality, not all occurrences are reported in a
timely manner by owner-managers. At the same time, due
to a lack of safety investment, SSEs suffer from a low safety
level of production. As their emphasis is on survival and
development, most SSEs fail to achieve the required safety
standards. Therefore, in this study, in the context of SSEs, we
model how they canmake proper safety investment decisions
and increase their safety level.
The survey results indicated that most SSEs showed
strong performance on the safety production level, which
meant that their frequency of safety occurrences was sig-
nificantly low. At the same time, safety investments among
the SSEs were insufficient, not only due to a lack of safety
awareness but also because of realistic constraints. Owner-
mangers generally chose to conceal safety occurrences rather
than report them because if they reported them, they would
be required to compensate employees and pay a penalty to
the government. Thus, insufficient safety investment could
cause an adverse chain reaction. To reduce safety investment,
a small number of SSEs even chose unsafe production.
Employees facing safety risks have the civic right to expose
or whistle blow, although most of them chose to keep silent.
For these reasons discussed above, employee EPOS-PB can
play a significant role in improving safety production levels.
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In order to understand how to stimulate and support them,
in the next section, we propose how to design and develop
a formal model based on ABM methodology. In doing this,
we will take into consideration all the major attributes of
the agents contextually involved: SSE; employees; public;
government.
4. Modeling Agent Attributes
4.1. Employee Attributes. The safety production levels at SSEs
affect the employees’ OSH conditions. According to extant
research [57], when the safety level of production is low,
the employee-perceived OSH level will also be relatively low.
Thus, employee OSH will be threatened by risks and hazards
that affect their workplace environment. In contrast, when
the safety level is high, the employee-perceived OSH level
will be relatively high; the OSH level of employees should be
maintained within a stable range. Therefore, the employee-
perceived OSH level related to safety level of production of
SSEs 𝑖 in 𝑡 period is as follows:
𝑂𝑆𝐻 𝑙𝑒V𝑒𝑙 = 𝜃 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 − 𝑙𝑒V𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 (1)
where 𝜃 is the random coefficient of the employee-perceived
OSH level in the range [0.8, 1.2]. Based on cognitive bias,
some employees may have a low perception of the safety level
even if the safety level is high, while some employees may
have a high perception of safety level even if the safety level
is low; some employees may have the same perception as the
actual safety level. Thus, the model sets a minimum value of
0.8 to represent a low-bias perception, a maximum value of
1.2 to represent a high-bias perception, and the value of 1 to
represent the same perception.
The value of employee-perceived OSH level can be used
to determine employees’ real value of safety production
efficiency. This value means that employees perform daily
production activities under a fixed level of safety, and the
degree of the safety level of production will decide the safety
efficiency for the employees.
𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
= 𝑀 ∗ (𝑂𝑆𝐻 𝑙𝑒V𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝜂 + 𝛿)
(2)
where 𝑀 = 0.22, 𝜂 = 0.4, and 𝛿 = 0.6. Small coal mine
enterprises were chosen to determine the value of𝑀, which
represents the efficiency coefficient without the influence of
the OSH level. 𝜂 and 𝛿 were determined by the system design
and repeated simulation experiments.
4.2. Public Attributes. Social Networking Services (SNS) and
Mass Media and Politics (MMP) offer opportunities for
employees to expose safety information to the public. Thus,
the public can obtain information directly from employ-
ees instead of owner-managers or safety news reports. An
enterprise’s public reputation value can impact the purchase
intention of customers and, subsequently, overall sales.
Therefore, the sales of SSEs can be calculated as follows:
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
=
{{{{
{{{{
{
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑆𝐶𝑡 ≥ 𝑅1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (𝑆𝐶𝑡 ∗ 0.5 + 0.6) 𝑅0 ≤ 𝑆𝐶𝑡 < 𝑅1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (𝑆𝐶𝑡 ∗ 0.167 + 0.8) 0 < 𝑆𝐶𝑡 < 𝑅0
(3)
where 𝑆𝐶𝑡 is the public reputation value in 𝑡 period, and
the threshold values of 𝑅0 and 𝑅1 represent the degree of
reputation value from employees, where 𝑅0 = 0.6 and 𝑅1 =
0.8. When the reputation value is low, sales will be negatively
influenced, and when the reputation value increases, sales
will increase correspondingly. When the public reputation is
more positive, sales will meet normal market demand. The
threshold and other values in (3) were determined based on
the system design and repeated simulation.
4.3. Government Attributes. Employees have civic rights to
blow the whistle on SSEs that break safety laws and regula-
tions or disobey OSH terms. Whistleblowing safety behavior
can attract government safety attention; the national admin-
istration of production supervision has the responsibility to
regulate safety production standardization and implement
OSH policy. Meanwhile, the government evaluates the safety
level of production at SSEs based on political and systematic
standardization, employee reports, and public response. Con-
sequently, the government puts in place a relevant political
strategy according to different levels of safety. Ultimately,
when the level of safety is below the standard, the government
will require SSEs to identify risks and hazards and improve
the workplace environment or be penalized if no action is
taken. Similarly, when the level of safety meets or exceeds the
requirement, the government will reward SSEs to maintain
their performance. The reward and penalty system is shown
as follows:
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =
{{{{{{{
{{{{{{{
{
𝑅, 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑇0
0, 𝑇0 ≤ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑇1
𝑃, 𝑇1 ≤ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑇2
𝐵, 𝑇2 ≤ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡
(4)
where the threshold values of 𝑇0, 𝑇1, and 𝑇2 represent the
reward and penalty standards based on the level of safety;
𝑇0 = 0.6, 𝑇1 = 0.7, and 𝑇2 = 0.8; 𝑃 and 𝐵 are the reward
values and𝑅 is the penalty value. According to safety laws and
survey results, the model determined 𝐵 = 50000, 𝑃 = 5000,
and 𝑅 = 10000 and the threshold values of 𝑇0, 𝑇1, and 𝑇2. It
is difficult to examine the effects of different levels of rewards
and penalties because of the complex system design.
Furthermore, the government has the function of tax
regulation. In order to encourage SSEs to improve the level
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Table 1: Adjustment probability of safety level of production.
Safety investment Profit Probability
Increase Increase (𝑝
𝑑 − 𝜀/2, 𝑝𝑖 + 𝜀, 𝑝𝑐 − 𝜀/2)
Decrease(or no change) (𝑝𝑑 + 𝜀/2, 𝑝𝑖 − 𝜀, 𝑝𝑐 + 𝜀/2)
Decrease Increase (𝑝
𝑑 + 𝜀, 𝑝𝑖 − 𝜀/2, 𝑝𝑐 − 𝜀/2)
Decrease (or no change) (𝑝𝑑 − 𝜀, 𝑝𝑖 + 𝜀/2, 𝑝𝑐 + 𝜀/2)
Unchanging Increase (𝑝
𝑑 − 𝜀/2, 𝑝𝑖 − 𝜔/2, 𝑝𝑐 + 𝜀)
Decrease (or no change) (𝑝𝑑 + 𝜀/2, 𝑝𝑖 + 𝜀/2, 𝑝𝑐 − 𝜀)
of safety, the government adjusts the tax rate according to the
level of safety as follows:
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
{{{{{{{
{{{{{{{
{
0.2, 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑇0
0.15, 𝑇0 ≤ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑇1
0.1, 𝑇1 ≤ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑇2
0.05, 𝑇2 ≤ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡
(5)
where 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 represents the evaluation result of the safety
level of production. Because of the complex system design,
the tax rate was determined by the system, although it was
difficult to show the tax rate in different simulations.
Finally, based on the safety policy, the government eval-
uates the reliability of the whistleblowing information and
once confirmed, it rewards the employee. When 𝐺𝐶𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑇0,
the whistleblowing reward value is shown as follows:
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 V𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
= 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 + 0.1
(6)
Equation (6) is utilized in the system, so it cannot be
found in other equations in the model.
4.4. SSE Attributes. SSEs have functions such as production,
selling, and profit. During the process of production, the
safety level of production will affect the OSH conditions of
employees and then affect employee production efficiency.
However, because of the characteristics of SSEs, most SSEs
have a low level of safety compared to large and medium
enterprises; thus, the safety level will significantly influence
production.The calculation method is from the safety invest-
ment model described by Lu et al. [63].
𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 − 𝑙𝑒V𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =
𝛽𝐾𝑖,𝑡
(1 + 𝛽𝐾𝑖,𝑡)
(7)
where 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 is the safety investment and 𝛽 is the control
coefficient, and 𝛽 = 0.33 according to the system design and
repeated simulation experiments.
Safety and productivity are two key factors for SSEs.
Most SSEsmay consider safety and productivity as conflicting
issues [76]. Some SSEs may choose to reduce safety invest-
ment and produce in an unsafe way as they consider profits
more important than safety [77]. According to the model, the
safety production function is decided by the fixed product
price 𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡, working time 𝑇, employee safety production
efficiency 𝑆𝑉, the number of employees 𝐸𝑁, and sales 𝑃𝑆 [78]
as follows:
𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑛
∑
𝑖=1
𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇 ∗ 𝑆𝑉 ∗ 𝐸𝑁 ∗ 𝑃𝑆 (8)
where 𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is 300 per unit, 𝑇 is 3 months, 𝐸𝑁 is 40, and𝑊𝐸
is 3000 CNY per person.
4.5. Self-Learning Algorithm of SSEs. Based on the economic
situation, the model includes a self-learning SSE mechanism
and the characteristic of bound rationality. To represent the
subjectivity of SSEs, this study applies the self-learning algo-
rithm so that the SSEs will change their safety investments
according to the periodic evolutionary trend of the safety
level of production. This self-learning algorithm includes
intellectuality and automaticity, which maintain the status of
effectiveness. Thus, it mimicsmore closely a realistic situation
and enables SSEs to make decisions to change their level of
safety investment.
SSEs will make decisions after the end of each period
based on two results: first, by evaluating the previous period,
they decide if the safety level of production is increas-
ing, decreasing, or unchanged during the current period,
compared to the previous one; and second, they decide if
profits are increasing, decreasing, or unchanged during the
current period, compared to the previous one. After the
two decisions, SSEs will adjust the probability of their safety
investment (see Table 1).
The system defines the probability vector of the safety
investment adjustment as 𝑝 = (𝑝𝑑, 𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑐), where 𝑝𝑑 rep-
resents the probability of a decreasing safety investment in
the next period, 𝑝𝑖 represents the probability of an increasing
safety investment in the next period, and 𝑝𝑐 represents the
probability of an unchanged safety investment in the next
period, where 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑖 + 𝑝𝑐 = 1.
A change in the current strategy is based on the previous
change in the safety level, and the change process reflects
the self-learning mechanism. When the current strategy is
completed, the system will randomly generate a number 𝑅
between 0 from 1 to decide which strategy the SSE applies.
𝐾𝑖,𝑡 =
{{{{
{{{{
{
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 − Δ𝐼1, 0 ≤ 𝑅 < 𝑝𝑑
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 − Δ𝐼2, 𝑝𝑑 ≤ 𝑅 < 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑖
𝐾𝑖,t−1, 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝑅 ≤ 1
(9)
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Figure 1: Interaction process among agents.
where Δ𝐼1 and Δ𝐼2 represent the increment and decrement
of the safety investment. These two numbers are related to
the safety level of production. Δ𝐼2 of high and medium safety
level SSEs is greater than the safety investment of low safety
level SSEs, and Δ𝐼1 of low safety level SSEs is greater than the
safety investment of high safety level SSEs.
The safety production cost 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 can be shown as the
relationship of the labor cost 𝐿𝐶𝑖,𝑡 and the production cost
𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡, and the safety investment 𝐾𝑖,𝑡.
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑛
∑
𝑖=1
𝐿𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 (10)
Finally, based on the above analysis, the profit of the SSEs can
be shown as follows:
𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑛
∑
𝑖=1
(1 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡) 𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡
(11)
4.6. Modeling Agent Interactions. As stated previously,
whistleblowing can take different forms such as exposing
safety information to the public and reporting the owner-
managers who do not comply with the standards of safety
regulations. When the public learns about safety incidences,
the reputation of SSE is affected, which thereby influences
the consumer purchase intention and, thus, the sales of
products. When the government receives a safety report, it
implements a reward and penalty system according to the
level of safety and also rewards whistleblowing behavior. In
actual practice, employees could choose to leave or ask for a
raise if they face poor safety conditions and owner-managers
are not willing to address them.
ABM includes three components: (1) properties, behav-
iors, and the environment of agents, (2) each agent’s interac-
tions with the environment, and (3) the interactions among
different agents [79].The schematic of the interaction process
among these agents is shown in Figure 1.
5. Simulated Scenarios and
Model Assumptions
5.1. Simulated Scenarios. The environment is defined based
on the characteristics of the SSEs and the parameters are
as close to reality as possible including the number of
employees, enterprise scale, the safety level of produc-
tion, safety production efficiency, and gross safe produc-
tion.
Based on the fluctuation of the safety level of production,
this paper presents five scenarios. The five scenarios simu-
late the interactions among the agents, including employee
EPOS-PB, the fluctuation of the reputation value of the
public reputation value, and the dynamic regulation of the
government. The scenarios aim to simulate reality to arrive
at the optimal strategy.
The five scenarios design the interaction between the
employees and the SSEs.The safety level of production affects
the OSH level of employees. The safety production efficiency
of employees is dependent on the perceived OSH level
and employees choose different strategies about production
activities. In Scenario 1, employees take no action to affect
the safety level of production and do not voice their safety
concerns in order to keep their positions. In Scenario 2,
based on the perceived OSH level, employees expose safety
occurrences through SNS and MMP, rather than blow the
whistle to a government entity. In Scenario 3, employees
directly blow the whistle to the government without relying
on SNS and MMP. In Scenario 4, employees choose to
expose safety occurrences to the public and blow the whistle;
thus, the public and the government have a dual-effect in
regulating the safety level of production. Finally, Scenario
5 reflects a more realistic situation; specifically, employees
choose to leave, or if they insist on staying, they demand
a raise, as the safety regulation of both the public and
the government shows a non-immediate effect and owner-
managers refuse to improve the workplace environment
and OSH level for employees. In addition, high safety
level SSEs will be able to recruit workers more easily; a
current issue for SSEs is difficulty in recruitment. Thus,
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low safety level SSEs will find it difficult to recruit employ-
ees.
5.2. Model Assumptions. Based on the literature, SSEs must
solve OSH issues and safety investment will impact the
safety level of production, which will then impact production
and sales. Focusing on production, the agents have different
attributes, for instance, the government can both inspect
and regulate safety. When the level of safety reaches high or
medium, the SSEs receive a reward; on the other hand, if there
is a low level of safety, SSEs will be penalized, required to fix
the problem, or shut down [80]. With the rapid development
of social media, employees could expose the level of safety
information to the public through SNS andMMP. In this way,
the public will bemade aware of the safety level of production
of the SSEs and could affect the safety attitudes of owner-
managers. ABM can be used to analyze the evolutional rules
of the safety level under different environments with different
interactions among the agents. Themodel assumptions are as
follows:
(1) To identify the interactions among the SSEs and
other agents, we assume that the number of SSEs is
fixed and the number of employees is based on the
characteristics of the SSE.
(2) To simplify the multi-dimensional safety level of
production, we consider the degree of safety invest-
ment as a key factor that affects the safety level of
production [63].
(3) In the system, SSEs sales are impacted by the public
and product prices are based on the SSE scenario.
(4) Based on the characteristics of the SSEs and the
design of the system, we assume that the increase
and decrease in the ratio of the safety investment are
controlled in a reasonable range.
(5) According to China safety production standardiza-
tion [81], we assume that SSEs are divided into
four types: first-degree safety level of production 𝑐1,
second-degree safety level of production 𝑐2, third-
degree safety level of production 𝑐3 , and fourth-degree
safety level of production 𝑐4. 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 represent a high
and medium level of safety while, 𝑐3 and 𝑐4 represent
meeting the standard and failing tomeet the standard,
respectively.
6. Model Results
To highlight the purpose of the experiment and the com-
parability of agents, the SSE safety level of production was
divided into four sublevels. In the model, the maximum
and minimum safety production standardization values were
𝑆𝐷max and 𝑆𝐷min, respectively, with 𝑆𝐷max = 100 and 𝑆𝐷min
= 0. The government evaluation values of safety production
standardization were defined as 𝑆max and 𝑆min. Thus, the
safety level of production of SSEs was 𝑠 ∈ (𝑠min = 𝑆min/
𝑆𝐷min, 𝑠max = 𝑆max/𝑆𝐷max).
𝑐 =
{{{{{{{{{{
{{{{{{{{{{
{
1, 810 (𝑠max + 𝑠min) ≤ 𝑠 < 𝑠max + 𝑠min
2, 710 (𝑠max + 𝑠min) ≤ 𝑠 <
8
10 (𝑠max + 𝑠min)
3, 610 (𝑠max + 𝑠min) ≤ 𝑠 <
7
10 (𝑠max + 𝑠min)
4, 𝑠min < 𝑠 <
6
10 (𝑠max + 𝑠min)
(12)
Two experiments were conducted to simulate the inter-
action among agents. The different scenarios illustrate the
evolutionary trend of SSEs and the profit of the SSEs based
on the interactions.
6.1. Evolutionary Rules of the Safety Level of Production
in Different Scenarios. The internal interactions between
employees and SSEs and the external interactions with the
public and the government show diversity and complexity.
The safety level of production will present different forms.
Thus, first, we simulated the evaluation number of the SSEs
to identify the optimal strategic scenario. Figures 2(a), 2(b),
2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) show the simulation trends of scenarios 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
Based on the simulations, in Scenario 1, where employees
take no action, the evolutionary level of all types of SSEs
was the lowest compared with the other four scenarios.
When reaching a specific period, 𝑐1 high-level safety SSEs
reached zero quickly. Second, in Scenario 2, where employees
expose information to the public, the evolutionary trend of
𝑐4 low-level safety SSEs was obviously faster than that in
Scenario 1. The 𝑐2 medium-level safety SSEs maintained a
steady trend and the highest position.The 𝑐1 and 𝑐3 (high- and
standard-level) SSEs showed a similar evolutionary trend,
which decreased with the periods.Third, in Scenario 3, where
employees blow the whistle, the decreasing rate of the 𝑐4
low-level safety SSEs was similar to Scenario 2. However,
𝑐1, 𝑐2, and 𝑐3 (high-, medium-, and standard-level) SSEs
showed a similar decreasing rate after the periods. Finally,
Scenario 4, where employees expose and blow the whistle,
and Scenario 5, where employee choose to leave or ask for
a raise, show similar evolutionary trends. Specifically, the 𝑐4
low-level safety SSEs show a closely related rate of decrease
in both scenarios. Due to the addition of the agents, the
interactions become positive; therefore, the fluctuation of 𝑐2
medium-level safety SSEs was greater in both scenarios. After
a short period, the trend of 𝑐1 high-level safety SSEs becomes
relatively stable and remains higher than the others. However,
the SSEs are more likely to evolve into the 𝑐1 type.
6.2. Rules of Profit Fluctuation of SSEs in Different Scenarios.
To explain the profit trends, we constructed different sce-
narios to show how SSEs develop through the interactions
of the agents. The SSE profit will change based on different
agent actions; each scenario simulates one situation. As the
interactions have five different agents, we cannot use a unified
indicator to evaluate the changing profits, but we can identify
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Figure 2: Evolutionary number of SSEs in different scenarios.
the changing trend by comparing the interactions among the
agents.
First, the SSE profit was the lowest in Scenarios 1 and
3, (no action and whistle blowing, respectively) relatively,
among all scenarios. SSE with low safety level went bankrupt
and exited the market. During the period, profit reached a
high point and then began to decline. However, the profit was
still far below zero. Second, the increase in the profit trendwas
faster in Scenario 2 (public exposure) when the profit peaked
and then started to decrease. However, the profit in Scenario
2 was smaller than in Scenarios 4 and 5. Finally, Scenario 4
(exposure and whistle blowing) showed a fast increasing rate
of profit initially, which then became more stable over the
periods. In contrast, in Scenario 5 (employees leave or ask
for a raise), the profit showed some fluctuation initially, then
a rapid increase. In the middle and final periods, the profit
trend continued to rise steadily. Figures 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d),
and 3(e) show the simulation trends of scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4, and
5, respectively.
The simulation results show that when SSEs only consider
productivity, employees remain silent about working condi-
tions and the public and the government neglect supervision
and regulation, with the result that SSEs have a lower level
of safety. Under these conditions, there is no incentive to
improve the safety level of production; thus, SSEs will remain
at their current safety level of production and there is less
probability that the level can evolve to a high or medium
level. Furthermore, at a lower level of safety, employees
suffer more risks and hazards. When injuries, accidents,
or fatalities occur, the employees, reputations, and sales of
the SSEs are affected due to public response and potential
administrative penalties from the government. Thus, in the
simulation, the SSE profit was extremely low when SSEs only
focused on productivity and ignored the safety production.
When the model added the reward and penalty system, we
observed the beginning of the intention to improve safety
production levels among the SSEs. When employee EPOS-
PB were included in the model, the safety level of production
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Figure 3: Fluctuating profit of SSEs in different scenarios.
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Table 2: The questionnaire about employee EPOS-PB and safety
level of production at the SSEs.
Item Description
Q1 I believe that taking no action will positively impact thesafety production level
Q2 I believe that exposing safety occurrences will positivelyimpact the safety production level
Q3 I believe that blowing the whistle on illegal productionbehavior will positively impact the safety production level
Q4 I believe that both exposing and blowing the whistle willpositively impact the safety production level
reached its highest point and remained steady over the long
term.
6.3.Model Validation. The level of validitywas determined by
the results of the surveys and of the safety level of production
of the SSEs. The questionnaire comprised a set of statements
about employee EPOS-PB and safety level of production
at the SSEs (Table 2). The questionnaire results showed the
level of perception of employees on a scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Employee beliefs on the
impact of protective-oriented safety proactivity on the safety
level of production and related optionswere determined from
the simulation scenarios stemming from the safety level of
production survey results.
According to the comparison between the simulation
results and the survey results, we introduced five classes of
safety values: Very low, Low, Medium, High, and Very high.
According to the values of the simulated scenarios, the model
and survey results are shown in Table 3.
The comparison between the model and survey shows
that the results are consistent. However, Scenario 5 could
not be verified by the survey because we could not obtain
information from employees who had already left their
jobs.
To validate the agent-based model between the agent
and model scenarios, the results of the survey were used.
The purpose of the survey was to acquire the employee
perceptions through interviews with actual SSE employees.
The model was validated through the comparison of the
model and the survey.
Simulated scenario results were matched with the survey
results. Specifically, Scenario 1 shows the lowest impact on the
safety level of production. Scenario 2 shows amedium impact
due to the interactions between employees and the public.
Scenario 3 shows a low impact as SSEs suffered a penalty or
political punishment. Scenario 4 shows a high impact with
effects from both the public and the government. Scenario 5
shows the highest impact not only on the basis of Scenario 4,
but also due to the more EPOS-PB.
7. Conclusion
Currently, few researches focus on proactivity safety based on
the method of ABM. Goh and Ali [82] proposed a hybrid
simulation framework of discrete event simulation, system
dynamics, and agent-based simulation to demonstrate the
relation between safety behavior and construction safety
management. Lu et al. [63] used agent-basedmodel to analyze
safety performance on a construction site based on a complex
system defined by interactions among a worksite, workers,
and safety investment. Agent-based approach was utilized
to analyze the relation between an air navigation service
provider and organizational safety culture by Sharpanskykh
and Stroeve [44].
Although the existing models are adequate in modeling
stakeholders that affect safety levels, they fall short in mod-
eling the integrative agents whose behaviors and attributes
impact the safety production level of SSEs. This objective of
the study is to utilize a bottom-up method of agent-based
modeling (ABM) to study EPOS-PB by combining the stake-
holders in the system and simulating their interactions. ABM
is an effective technique to develop computational models of
SMEs safety of production and dynamic interactions. Other
methodological approaches cannot show the advantages
because most of them are linear and non-dynamic. The
simulation results show a dynamic evolution of the safety
level. They also point to low-cost and highly effective safety
interventions for SSEs and optimal safety strategies for policy
makers.
The model validation was performed based the com-
parison between the simulation and survey results. The
comparison showed that most model results were consistent
with the results of the employees’ survey workshop. The
survey results were used not only for the model input but
also for the validity of the model results. However, Scenario 5
cannot be validated because of reality constraints.
Based on the simulations of the interactions among the
different agents, one significant finding was that rather than
remaining silent, if employees pursue EPOS-PB, they canhelp
improve the safety level of production at their SSE. Another
significant finding was that SSEs should not only target
productivity but also a high safety level of production. As
profit is the key goal necessary to survive and develop, owner-
managers should equally value both safety and production,
instead of having to reduce safety investment to maintain
profits.
At a practical level, the findings suggest that safety inter-
ventions should aim at focusing on EPOS-PB and the respon-
sibility of the public and the government, which becomes the
most effective in improving safety level production of SSEs.
Specially, employees should consider safety as the core and
basic requirement; they should not only blow the whistle
immediately on illegal and unsafe production activities to
the government but also report safety information to the
public. When facing owner-managers’ refusal in improving
safety levels, employees should leave the job or demand for
a raise to make additional efforts to improve the workplace
environment. The public currently has few channels for
employees to expose safety occurrences.Therefore, the public
should offer specific SNS and MMP to allow employees to
report safety issues. Furthermore, regarding policy makers,
employees may experience ethics pressure if they choose
to be a whistleblower. Thus, the government should install
anonymous telephone hotlines and conceal whistleblowers’
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Table 3: The values of the simulated scenarios and the survey questionnaire.
Simulated Scenarios Model Survey Mean SD
Scenario 1: Average impact of employees taking no action Very low Very low 1.78 0.797
Scenario 2: Average impact of employees exposing safety
occurrences Medium Medium 2.48 0.588
Scenario 3: Average impact of employees blowing the whistle
on illegal production behavior Low Low 3.63 0.615
Scenario 4: Average impact of employees both exposing and
blowing the whistle High High 4.04 0.767
Scenario 5: Average impact of employees adding turnover
and demanding for a raise on the basis of Scenario 4. Very high -
information. The national government should simultane-
ously encourage employees to blow the whistle and formulate
a series of laws and policies to protect whistleblowers. In
addition, a more humanized reward and penalty system can
be designed; for instance, implementing a purely monetary
awards and punishment mechanism could provide safety
assistance to SSEs, such as purchasing safety services in a
discount, pressuring owner-managers to implement OSH
policy in a gentle way. The government should not only
reward whistleblowers, but also provide policy guarantee to
employees to make them feel safe about their workplace envi-
ronment andOSH condition. Finally, the standard evaluation
of the safety level for SSEs should be less strict, comparedwith
that for large and medium enterprises.
Improving the safety levels in SSEs is not only dependent
on the efforts of owner-managers but also on the combined
efforts of employees, the public, and the government. The
results from these simulations can be used to provide the pub-
lic, policy makers, and owner-managers with information on
how employee EPOS-PB can affect safety production levels
for SSEs. The public, policy makers, and university research
teams can practically use this ABM model. Specifically, the
results can give the changing safety trend of SSEs for the
public, different ratio regulations and safety regulation for
policy makers, and safety researches for university research
teams.
The study has some limitations. First, the ABM is
abstracted from real-world SSEs and it cannot simulate fully
all factors related to the current market situation. Second, the
model could be better integrated. Finally, this study does not
consider additional agents, such as labor unions or financing
institutions.
Therefore, in future work, the ABM model could be
modified to add more agents and build more impact factors
to make the ABMmodel more realistic.
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